In May 1998, India detonated 5 underground nuclear weapons in the Pokhran range, a mere 300 miles from the Pakistani border. Code-named Operation Shakti, the explosions caught US intelligence agencies completely off-guard. Despite intense US surveillance efforts, and three-decades' old nuclear nonproliferation regime, India forced its way into the vaunted \"nuclear club\". Till this day, the 1998 Indian nuclear test is widely regarded as one of the greatest failures in the history of American intelligence. In fact, 1998 was not the first time India detonated a nuclear device. In 1974, Indira Gandhi's government conducted a test explosion code-named \"Smiling Buddha\" at the very same site. However, India was able to convince the world that this was a \"peaceful nuclear explosion\" and thereby forestalled its induction into the global nuclear club. This then compels the question; how did the American intelligence community fail to foresee the events of 1974 and 1998? This thesis seeks to answer this question through analyzing declassified American intelligence documents, uncovering the ingrained biases in the American intelligence community and academia, which led to the underestimation of India in the global stage.
"},{"label":"Degree","value":["Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors"]},{"label":"Author-supplied Keywords","value":["Nuclear","Intelligence","India"]},{"label":"Administrative Note","value":"Drupal Node ID: 24099