Modern studies of the Stoics have demonstrated that, during the school's history, they became progressively more interested in ethics and less interested in physics and logic consequently. In the later Stoics this partially manifests itself in Epictetus' concept of a totally free will, despite his orthodox belief in a providentially ordered universe. This thesis studies the image of Stoic agency through the history of the school, beginning with the orthodox views of the early Stoics, then examining Epictetus' concept of the will, and concluding with Marcus Aurelius' freedom of action. I argue that over this period, the concept of fate largely stayed the same, but saw the hand of the divine in producing fated events progressively decrease. In the early history of the school, Chrysippus' cylinder-top analogy offers an orthodox Stoic understanding where providence not only creates each individual through the causal chain of fate, but also determines each of their actions and judgments throughout their life. Though, in Epictetus, our lives and what we do in them are similarly fated according to our individual natures, the concept of the will means we have the absolute freedom to decide how we respond to that fact, without providence directly informing that response. Marcus Aurelius—sometimes considered non-Stoic for his views—goes even farther in imagining that even our actions are free from providential decree, yet still obey fate because fated events are determined by a variety of factors outside of our control.
"},{"label":"Degree","value":["Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors"]},{"label":"Author-supplied Keywords","value":["Stoicism","Agency","Providence"]},{"label":"Administrative Note","value":"Drupal Node ID: 33887