This thesis explores the strategic aspects of the residential rent relationship and poses the question of how tenants can endogenously enforce their rights in the absence of government intervention. For both historical and practical reasons, service provision commitments in rental contracts are notoriously difficult to enforce through the legal process. Using an imperfect contracting model of the strategic relationship between landlords and tenants, I find that in a world without rent strikes, service provision is strictly suboptimal. Moreover, both landlord and tenant payoffs are compromised ex ante by imperfect contracting, although individual landlords benefit ex post from the ability to take quasi-rents by shirking on service provision. I therefore present the rent strike as a strategy by which organized tenants may be able to endogenously induce optimal service provision without relying on contracts. I find that if evicting rent strikers is sufficiently legally difficult, tenants will always be able to induce Pareto-optimal service levels. Conversely, if landlord eviction costs are low, strike coordination (and thus the ability to induce service improvements) depends on the number of tenants who use the service and on the relational and organizational structures among tenants. Specifically, strong channels of communication and binding strategic commitment mechanisms are crucial for rent strike coordination, but delegating strategic decisions to a unitary agent is unnecessary. These results suggest that decentralized \"informal\" tenant unions hold promise as future rent strike agents. Finally, I make a policy case for anti-eviction laws as a means of not only protecting tenants but also driving more efficient outcomes in rent relationships.
"},{"label":"Degree","value":["Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors"]},{"label":"Administrative Note","value":"Drupal Node ID: 24212